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When he was asked during a lecture, ''What would you think is the 
best Protestant religious picture?" Paul Tillich unhesitatingly replied, 
"Guernica." But where, in this picture, are the gods, the angels, the 
Christ figures, the madonnas, the martyred saints, the crosses, the stars 
of David? In fact, there are none. "Guernica" is not a religious 
painting, but, as Tillich insists, the work exposes the "disruptiveness, 
existential doubt, emptiness and meaninglessness" of modern existence, 
and thus "it does have religious style in a very deep and profound 
sense."l 
As in painting so in literature too. Picasso's images would not seem 
at all out of place in Milton's Hell. Here too we find surrealistic 
distortion, ontological stress, disruptiveness, emptiness, meaninglessness 
within a cell-like confinement. Granted, Hell's inhabitants are fallen 
angels, not mortals, but who would argue that despite their 
unpardonable apostasy, Milton painted their anguish in deliberately 
mortal terms? Like "Guernica," Hell is devoid of overtly religious 
trappings, but again like "Guernica," I would argue, it possesses a 
style more evocative than any of the overtly sacred scenes in Milton's 
Heaven, which, despite their proliferation of holy objects and symbols, 
remain for most readers religiously sterile. 
For a long time the question of religious literary style has been 
hostage to Theology.2 Analysts have routinely worked from the premise 
that the catalytic presence of the word "God" initiates a linguistic 
transsubstantiation, effecting semantic and syntactic change in any 
text in which it appears.3 David Crystal and Derek Davy, for example, 
conclude from their analysis of formal religiOUS texts that "regardless 
of the purpose of the piece of religious language being ex-
amined-whether it be a statement of belief, or a prayer of praise or 
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supplication-it is the case that the meaning of the whole derives from 
and can be detennined only by reference to this concept of 'God.",4 
The proposition "God created the heavens and the earth," for example, 
holds a different meaning for the believer than, say, "Christopher Wren 
created st. Paul's:' a fact which has prompted the quip that "God 
is a very improper proper name."s 
To many, granting such semantic tyranny to "God" smacks of "word 
magic,,,6 and recently the discussion of religious style has shifted its 
focus from theology to language to the point that it is fashionable 
for even theologians to speak of the '1inguisticality" of religious 
experience. Gordon Kaufrnan, for example, contends that "there is 
no such thing as a raw pre-linguistic experience of 'transcendence'. 
. . . [It] is shaped, delimited and informed by the linguistic symbols 
which also name it. Without those symbols to guide our consciousness 
these 'experiences' would not be available to us at all."7 He is joined 
by Theodore Jennings, Jr., who adds that "the mere presence or 
prominence of 'god' in a discourse tells us very little. It is not the 
case that the presence of this term marks a different or new language 
game . . . . It is the language game that governs the meaning of the 
term and not the reverse."B 
Kenneth Burke's de-theologizing of the issue ("whether or not there 
is a realm of the 'supernatural,' there are words for it,,9) holds 
particular appeal for literary scholars sensitive to the hazards of 
rendering non-religious accounts of essentially religious enterprises 
like Paradise Lost, for although such works may still carry "something 
of the air of a foreign languagelllO (Rosalie Colie confesses that reading 
Herbert's devotional poems is like "seeing a poem in, say, Swedish"l1), 
it need not be because their comprehension is restricted to a charmed 
circle of believers. "God" is no verbal talisman magically rendering 
a style religious; to the contrary, it is style that gives "God" its 
meaning. 
The late Bishop of Durham, Ian Ramsey, provides a practical 
demonstration of how that happens. Looking at such conventional 
theological phrases as "First Cause:' "Infinitely Wise," "Infinitely 
Good," and "Creation ex nihilo" he notes how in each phrase an 
absolute empirical "moder' becomes stricken with "logical impropriety" 
when it is yoked to an "odd" religious qualifier. "Creation," for 
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example, is a perfectly straightforward empirical notion. It has no 
inherent religious significance by itself. But when it is "qualified" by 
"ex nihilo," its empirical meaning is immediately destabilized.12 A 
psychological process is initiated that works like this: the devotee 
meditates on "creation," imagining the varieties of creation ideas within 
his experience: building, painting, composing, birth and so forth. "Ex 
nihilo" provides a new direction to his thought. "Creation from 
nothing" challenges his conceptual logic. He is inspired to develop 
"creation stories" in his mind, which strive to accomodate "ex nihilo," 
until, eventually, at some point in the meditation, a qualitative change 
occurs-the "penny drops," to use Ramsey's expression, the "light 
dawns" and he "sees" the religious insight that has been latent in 
the phrase all alongP "Ex nihilo" ruptures the linguistic complacency 
of its empirical model (or, as Jacques Derrida might explain it, it 
decenters its logocentric presuppositions14) thereby provoking a 
religiously salutary ontological confusion. 
Ramsey's insight is that religious style deliberately promotes 
ontological shock by allowing an apparently uniform network of 
surface syntactical entailment to be ruptured by a rival logic "breaking 
through out of the depths." Gerhard Ebeling stresses the "polarity" 
of this stylistic phenomenon, characterizing it as the "dialogue of faith 
with the experience of the world." He explains that "the two poles 
of this process of language do not exist as independent entities, 
which as such can be disentangled from one another, ... [but] are 
only what they are in their relationship with each other."lS Religious 
style, in other words, does not generate from the language of the world 
nor from the language of faith but from their dynamiC entanglement. 
No better literary demonstration of this entanglement exists than 
in the language of Milton's Hell. It is an unlikely locale for religious 
style, considering that it is "As far remov'd from God and light of 
Heav'n / As from the Center thrice to th' utmost Pole" (I, 73-74).16 
Then, too, who is more profane than its leading citizen, the apostate 
Satan? Whose language is more rebelliously humanistic, more 
boastfully self-reliant, more self-conSciously secular than the fallen 
horde? Taken as a self-contained linguistic environment, Hell seems 
relentlessly dedicated to unfettered self-determination: "Here at least 
/ We shall be free" (I, 258-59). 
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The catch-and this is what renders Hell's language "religious"-is 
that Satan's words, despite their deliberately secular formulation, cannot 
evade dialogical entanglement with God whose challenging authority, 
in Tillich's words, keeps breaking through out of the depths to the 
surface. In his ''Dungeon horrible" (I, 61), Satan is not even 
linguistically free. Like it or not, his words are theologically entailed. 
God's omniscient, totalitarian presence (like the naked light bulb in 
"Guernica") hovers over "The dismal Situation waste and wild" (I, 
60), casting disturbing shadows on its semantic terrain. True, Satan 
never utters the word "God" in Hell, as we might expect, considering 
the threat it poses to its unsponsored autonomy, but he doesn't have 
to. "God's" qualifying presence has already been contextually 
established. Hell is no self-contained vacuum, nor is its language. The 
language of Hell is bifurcated conversation-a polar constituent of 
a larger dialogue. Satan's every apostate word jars against an unheard 
but strongly felt rival connotation which automatically precipitates 
an evocative double entendre. Though his words have ostensibly declared 
their semantic independence-like their speaker ("his form had yet 
not lost / All her Original brightness" [I, 591-92D-they nevertheless 
bear the unextinguished sparks of their original meanings-tiny 
connotative glimmers of lost glory which agitate Satan's speech, 
preventing its escape to unsponsored literalism. 
Kenneth Burke may have the language of the fallen angels in mind 
when he speaks of the "logological" transformation of terms that occurs 
when theological words are "de-analogized" and returned to an 
empirical realm. Noting that words appropriate for supernatural use 
are borrowed analogically from empirical settings, Burke urges that 
the 
order can be reversed. We can borrow back the terms from the borrower, 
again secularizing to varying degrees the original secular terms that had 
been given 'supernatural' connotations. 
Consider the word 'grace,' for instance. Originally . . . it had such purely 
secular meanings as: favor, esteem, friendship, partiality, service, obligation, 
thanks, recompense, purpose. . . . [but] once the word was translated into 
the supernaturally tinged realm of relationships between 'God' and man, 
the etymological conditions were set for a reverse process whereby the 
theological term could in fact be aestheticized, as we came to look for 'grace' 
in a literary style, or in the purely secular behavior of a hostess. 
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Burke cites some other instances of logological transformation such 
as "create" and "spirit," and suggests that 
if we would 'analogize' by the logological transforming of terms from their 
'supernatural' reference into their possible use in a realm so wholly 'natural' 
as that of language considered as a purely empirical phenomenon, such 
'analogizing' in this sense would be really a kind of 'de-analogizing.' Or 
it would be, except that a new dimension really has been added .... There 
is a sense in which language is not just 'natural' but really does add a 'new 
dimension' to the things of nature.1 
It is not difficult to see how the word "freedom" on Satan's fallen 
lips has undergone such a logolocial transformation. Its theological 
connotation as the freedom to find self-fulfillment through obedience 
to 'God's' will has logologically changed to a freedom from constraints 
imposed by such obedience; the "golden scepter" has changed to 
"iron." And yet, a faint patina of the gold clings to the word, affording 
it a "new dimension" which deters readers from a total capitulation 
to Satan's profane literalism. Concluding that "farthest from him [God] 
is best" (I, 247), Satan seeks to put linguistic as well as geographic 
distance between his cohorts and God by flattening the logological 
dualism that their apostate stance automatically generates. He strives 
to reduce God from an omnipotent Mystery to a mere powerful 
adversary by subjecting Him to logical entailments appropriate to 
creature, not Creator. For example, rather than understanding merit 
as value that God confers upon those who please Him, Satan regards 
it as an autonomous virtue which, in his case, God has inaccurately 
assessed. Similarly, "grace," for Satan, is not something that is freely 
bestowed but instead a "de-analogized" act which incurs obligation 
for the recipient. 
Yet for the reader these words refuse to bend completely to Satan's 
will. Their forms retain a glimmer of their "Original brightness" (I, 
592), and the "new dimension" they carry with them assures that the 
center of semantic activity in Satan's fallen utterances hovers between 
the theological meanings of these words and the debased versions 
he accords them. The contention of these gold and iron connotations 
quickens their hermeneutical potential by automatically triggering a 
logic of encounter according to which (as we recall from Ebeling) the 
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language of faith and the language of the world "are only what they 
are in their relationship with each other." In other words, they 
communicate perfonnatively through dynamic skirmish. The contention, 
not the substance, of these utterances is their essential meaning. 
Thus, Satan's "Here at least / We shall be free" is an ontological 
presupposition which he can keep viable only so long as he can 
sanitize Hell of all theological qualification. Predictably, the fallen 
angels "naturalize" their allusions to God by refusing to use the word 
"God" at all (I, 133) and "fixt Laws of Heav'n" (Il, 18). In other 
instances, they favor such descriptions as "the Torturer" (Il, 64), "our 
great Enemy" (11, 137), ''Th' Almighty Victor" (11, 144), "Our Supreme 
Foe" (II, 210), "the Thunderer" (II, 28), "Potent Victor" (I, 95), "our 
grand Foe" (I, 122), "our Conqueror" (I, 143), and "the angry Victor" 
(I, 169). While the defeated angels do concede God's political control 
over Heaven .by the epithets "King of Heav'n" (Il, 229), "Heav'n's 
Lord Supreme" (11, 236), "Heav'n's all-ruling Sire" (Il, 264), "the King 
of Heav'n" (Il, 316), and "Heav'n's high Arbitrator" (11, 359), they 
clearly indicate with these tenns that they regard God as tantamount 
to a powerful ruler of an enemy nation rather than as their Supreme 
Creator. The only epithet in Books One and Two that remotely 
threatens to destabilize the logical neutrality of Hell is Beelzebub's 
"Heav'n's perpetual King" (I, 131), where the qualifying adjective 
"perpetual" (like standard theological qualifiers such as "eternal," 
"infinite," and "ex nihilo") threatens to liberate "King" from its worldly 
denotation into "model" status. Nowhere in these opening books do 
the fallen angels utter the word "God." But despite these overt efforts 
to purge the claims of faith from hellish discourse, the fallen angels 
are helpless to prevent an embedded theological leavening from having 
its way and rendering even the most consciously secular utterances 
religious. 
That leavening shows itself in the logological transfonnations of key 
words, to be sure, but it also resides in the landscape of Hell. Murray 
Roston sees Milton's Hell as a baroque achievement which, unlike 
"the ethereal dimensions of the celestial battle," is a "more solid, 
limited setting, human in scale." He surmises that Milton "needed 
the scene in Hell as a stepping stone to the celestial vision.,,18 Rather 
than a stepping-stone, I would suggest that Hell's landscape is more 
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like a glass through which we see celestial visions darkly, for even 
though Roston may be right in appreciating a baroque corporeality 
in these scenes, there is also a marked translucence. We see this 
translucence in such famous phrases as "darkness visible" (1,63), which 
introduce us to the powerful potentiality of religious language to "de-
naturalize" description and render it currency for religious insight. 
Here we have a typical example of a model-qualifier situation of the 
sort Ramsey discusses. The logical impropriety it sponsors clearly 
announces that the descriptive language of Hell is anything but 
straightforward. Its mood is not indicative (offering explications of 
"the way things are") but, to use a theological term, kerygmatic, that 
is, language which deliberately destabilizes linguistic and experiential 
complacency with the rupturing impact of the Word of GOd.19 Rather 
than creating a mirror image of a presumed state of affairs, kerygmatic 
language sponsors ontological shock. As Jennings points out, "It is 
the interruption of structure that brings the structure into view,20 and 
this is what kerygmatic language does; it makes the darkness of Hell 
visible by exposing its contingency. 
Although the disrupting dialogical nature of kerygmatic description 
evokes more than what is seen, it does not deny or supplant the 
baroque corporeality of Hell. One of the most misunderstood features 
of religious language is that its roots are firmly anchored in empirical 
soil; it resists what Frederick Ferre has called ''logical docetism"-a 
form of so-called religious expression so insulated from practical 
human experience, so rigidly other-worldly, that "the value of the 
human is minimized, denied, and deplored, ostensibly to glorify the 
miraculous inspiration of the divine." Such language, Ferre concludes, 
"violates the debased human by the divine" and "instead of 'inspiring' 
the human, assaults and replaces it."21 We may recognize this sort 
of logical docetism in the speeches of God in Book Three where the 
absence of religious style is so unfortunately evident.22 These speeches 
are metaphysical rather than religious constructions and seem to have 
their formal roots in scholasticism, although literary scholars have 
labored hard to devise a host of alternative rationalizations for their 
opaque austerity.23 But in Hell Milton's style is not constrained by 
arid scholasticism nor by arbitrary principles of internal decorum but 
cleaves to the dictates of Christianity's most unique literary form, the 
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New Testament parable, which consolidates all of the features of 
religious style which, up to this point, have been variously character-
ized by the words "encounter," "polarity," ''kerygmatic,'' ''logological,'' 
and ''logical impropriety." 
Biblical parables have often been demeaned to the status of mere 
fables in the course of exegetical history ironically because they are 
anchored to the realism of worldly experience and seem to offer ethical 
counsel even though, as students of the parable acknowledge, their 
essential distinctiveness is kerygmatic, that is, their encouragement 
of a religiously salutary confusion of moral and ontological values. 
Protestant exegetical tradition in particular has scrupulously isolated 
the parable from standard literary tropes, insisting that it is functionally 
distinct from such secular kin as allegory, fable, and even metaphor 
itself (when by metaphor is meant the mere analogical process of 
saying one thing and meaning another). Christian hermeneutics has 
generally regarded the parable as a form which effects the interpenetra-
tion of worldly and divine realities. C. H. Dodd, for example, defends 
the acknowledged "realism" of the biblical parables by declaring that 
"since nature and supemature are one order, you can take part of 
that order and find in it illumination for other parts.,,24 
Milton's hell vividly depicts a situation where the divineness of a 
fallen order is illuminated, and it does so, like the New Testament, 
parabolically. Milton employs none of the standard analogical forms 
of scholasticism such as analogia entis, analogia gratiae, the analogy 
of proportionality, or even (as he later does with Raphael) "accomo-
dation." These forms stress the discontinuity of worldly and 
transcendent realities and encourage the sort of logical docetism that 
threatens to flatten religious style into either sentimental piety or 
secular indifference. The key to Milton's success in the early books 
of Paradise Lost is that he gives full measure to worldly realism 
without sacrificing religious potency. As Wiley Sypher once put it, 
"Paradise Lost secularizes, in a grave and special way, the transcenden-
tal.,,25 Like the New Testament parables, it exhibits the extraordinary 
in the ordinary and not beyond it. 
The Cyclopaedia of Biblical, Theological, and Ecclesiastical Literature 
instructs us that 
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Were we to speak of the word of God as a seed we might be said to use 
a metaphor, but in that case we transfer the properties of the seed to the 
Word; the seed itself, having suggested the particular property upon which 
we wish to dwell, vanishes from our thoughts. But when as a part of 
instruction by parable we use the same expression, the idea of the seed abides 
with us, and the keeping before our minds of its actual history, that we 
may ascend from it into another sphere, is a necessary part of the mental 
process through which we pass.26 
The parabolic metaphor never "vanishes from our thoughts" but 
"abides," maintaining continuity with, not segregation from, its referent. 
In this regard it resembles what Max Black calls an "interaction-
metaphor" which has the "power to bring two separate domains into 
cognitive relation by using language directly appropriate to the one 
as a lens for seeing the other; the implications, suggestions, and 
supporting values entwined with the literal use of metaphorical 
expression enable us to see a new subject matter in a new way.,,27 
The parable, like religious language generally, far from segregating 
transcendent from natural logic, merges them in such a way that it 
"is the bearer of the reality to which it refers. The hearer not only 
learns about that reality, he participates in it. He is invaded by it.,,28 
Of all the inhabitants of Hell few rival Mammon for sheer material 
realism, and few are less likely instruments of religious discernment. 
Milton's depiction of him as a fallen angel in Hell seems appropriate 
enough, but "what it implies about Heaven" has given at least one 
critic pause:29 
Mammon led them on, 
Mammon, the least erected Spirit that fell 
From Heav'n, for ev'n in Heav'n his looks and thoughts 
Were always downward bent, admiring more 
The riches of Heav'n's pavement, trodd'n Gold, 
Than aught divine or holy else enjoy'd 
In vision beatific ... (I, 678-84) 
The worldly realism of Mammon's portrait seems in conflict with the 
decorum of Heaven. Can an as yet unfallen Mammon show signs of 
avarice? Can wealth hold attraction for a denizen of Heaven? Is it 
not a "terrible reduction of heavenly existence to picture one so high 
in spiritual excellence bent over musing on the worth of Heaven's 
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pavement"? These are improprieties that understandably occur to 
readers unaccustomed to the parabolic nature of religious style; 
instead of looking through the passage toward the religious discernment 
it was designed to arouse, they look at it, mistaking its means for 
its end. True religious style is rooted in empirical soil, but it is also 
in active conversation with the transcendent. In other words, it is 
theologically qualified which more often than not shows itself in logical 
improprieties. Robert Funk, for instance, says that 
like the cleverly distorted picture puzzles children use to work, the parable 
is a picture puzzle which prompts the question, What's wrong with this 
picture? Distortions of everydayness, exaggerated realism, distended 
concreteness, incompatible elements often subtly drawn-are what prohibit 
the parable from coming to us in the literal sense.30 
Funk's description could just as easily fit "Guernica" or Milton's Hell, 
for the style of the parable is the style of all authentic religious 
expression-something is always ''breaking through out of the depths 
to the surface" bearing a disquieting disclaimer to any assurance that 
"Here at least / We shall be free." 
How then, do we honor the religious style of the Mammon passage? 
The classic definition of the parable is C. H. Dodd's: 
At its simplest the parable is a metaphor or simile drawn from nature or 
common life, arresting the hearer by its vividness or strangeness, and leaving 
the mind in sufficient doubt about its precise application to tease it into 
active thought.31 
"Strangeness" seems to be the most troubling characteristic of parabolic 
religious style. To some the Mammon passage violates common sense. 
The pieces refuse to fall into place, and "strangeness" becomes 
synonymous with "mistake." Others, however, may find the rush of 
provocative questions that the passage spawns (each one bearing its 
own fresh cargo of articulation possibilities) are full of potential 
religiOUS disclosures: How odd that Mammon, "the least erected Spirit," 
should be a "leader." And the humorous wordplay with '1east erected" 
and "downward bent." What a provocatively ambivalent blend of 
words denoting both status and physical description. Mammon, of 
course, is '1east erected" both actually and figuratively, but he is 
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perhaps more significantly "bent" physically over to admire the golden 
pavement at the same time that such an activity is his "bent." Even 
the word "riches" takes on an irony from context; to think that "riches" 
in heaven are what the divine denizens "trod" upon provides a richly 
ironic value judgment. The point is that the passage is literally alive 
with hermeneutical and even logological activity which the common 
sense point of view simply ignores or, worse, cites as Milton's 
"irresponsibility toward language." Mammon's description is indeed 
"vivid and strange" in the parabolic sense of those words, and it is 
this very quality which affords it a religiously salutary purposefulness. 
What kind of applications does the Mammon passage recommend? 
No specific one on the face of it, but it is suggestive of an attitude 
that emerges from the logical oddities, the puns and the paradoxes 
that make up the very fabric of the description. We have, for example, 
all the necessary raw material for developing a Christian colloquy on 
riches or even a reconfirmation of the entire Christian value system. 
The passage also teases us with the mystery of sin (How does it occur? 
When does it occur? Is sin inevitable? What constitutes the committing 
of a sin?). But most important of all, the passage applies itself to us 
viscerally by forcing Mammon upon our very personalities. We become 
Mammon through a deliberately designed identification process. Here 
is this angelic abstraction, laden with its impressive cargo of symbolic 
significance, suddenly incarnated before our eyes, and immediately 
the frailty of that flesh we see as the frailty of our flesh. Mammon 
is "arrestingly vivid" because we see ourselves in him; he is "strange" 
because he is simultaneously an angel caught up in the awesome 
drama of heavenly apostasy. Suddenly it must occur to us that the 
great cosmological drama of divine treason which Mammon '1eads" 
is the identical drama that is reenacted daily in the individual 
Christian's soul. Mammon brings two worlds together; the homely 
and the cosmic meld. His predicament is discovered as our predica-
ment, and we are stricken with the realization that it is not we who 
are interpreting Mammon but Mammon who is interpreting us. 
There is no indicative mood in the grammar of Hell, only a 
performative one intent upon teasing our minds into active thought 
and our hearts into fundamental change. As a descriptive account of 
"how things are" in the "Dungeon horrible" its style is as inaccurately 
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chaotic as "Guemica," but as a prescriptive parable it generates the 
same ontological anxiety that makes Picasso's painting so disquietingly 
evocative of human contingency. In both works there is an implicit 
polar tension-a disrupting awareness of something breaking through 
from the depths to the surface, which Tillich identifies as the hallmark 
of religious style. 
Wiley Sypher characterizes Milton's style by suggesting that "as a 
poet he is the maker of resplendent images, as Puritan he is a mighty 
image breaker-Eikonoklastes," and that consequently, he is "so 
enthralled by the wealth of his haptic imagination that he does not 
appear to be fully awake to the contradictions between his baroque 
sensuousness and his Puritanism.,,32 This may well be, but perhaps 
a less labored explanation of the alleged "dissociation" is to acknowl-
edge it as the natural conduct of a superbly functioning religious 
style-a style as venerable as the New Testament itself. 
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